- Funktion:
- Institutsvorstand
- Telefon:
- +43 463 2700 4141
- E-Mail:
- Paul [dot] Schweinzer [at] aau [dot] at
- Raum:
- B02.2.63a
- Sprechstunde:
- Donnerstag 10-12 oder via BBB https://classroom.aau.at/b/pas-4y3-xxz
Campus-Portal Visitenkarte | Lehrveranstaltungen | Forschung
- Mechanismusdesign
- Mikroökonomie
- Spieltheorie
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Neueste Forschungsarbeiten
“A treshold model of urban development”, with Alberto Vesperoni, CESifo Working Paper #7326.
“A theory of entrepreneurship”, with Alex Gershkov and J. Li.
“Contesting fake news”, with Beatrice Roussillon.
Ausgewählte Publikationen
“Auctioning risk: The all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences”, with B. Klose, Economic Theory, 73, 2022, 881-916.
“Dream teams and the Apollo effect”, with A. Gershkov, Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 6, 2021, 113-148.
“The parental co-immunization hypothesis: An observational competing risks analysis”, with Miguel Portela, Scientific Reports, 9:2493, 2019.
“How to share it out: The value of information in teams”, with A. Gershkov and J. Li, Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 2016, 261-304.
“Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction”, with O. Bos and B. Roussillon, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 118(4), 2016, 785-815.
“Implementation without Incentive Compatibility: Two Stories with Partially Informed Planners”, with M. Shimoji, Games and Economic Behavior, 91, 2015, 258-267.
“Probabilistic Procurement Auctions”, with T. Giebe, Review of Economic Design, 19, 2015, 25-46.
“Consuming your way to Efficiency: Public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries”, with T. Giebe, European Journal of Political Economy, 36, 2014, 1-12.
“All-pay-all aspects of political decision making”, with T. Giebe, Public Choice, 161(1), 2014, 73-90.
“The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests”, with E. Segev, Public Choice, 153(1), 2012, 69-82.
“When queueing is better than push and shove”, with Alex Gershkov, International Journal of Game Theory, 39(3), 2010, 409-430.
“Sequential bargaining with common values”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 46, 2010, 109-121.
“Efficient Tournaments within Teams”, with Alex Gershkov and Jianpei Li, RAND Journal of Economics, 40(1), Spring 2009, 103-119.
“Labour market recruiting with intermediaries”, Review of Economic Design, 12(2), 2008, 119-127.
“The Roles of Stories in Applying Game Theory”, with Till Grüne-Yanoff, Journal of Economic Methodology, 15(2), 2008, 131-146.
“Two competing paradigms in Austrian economic theory”, Notizie di Politeia, 59, 2000, 44-66.
Full details of publications can be found at RePEc.
Editorial Service
Co-editor von Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
Konferenz Mechanism and Institution Design
2020 Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design
Unsere diesjährige Konferenz, ausgerichtet vom Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt/Celovec, findet von Donnerstag-Samstag 11.-13. Juni 2020 statt.
Auf Grund der COVID-19 Pandemie ist es unmöglich die Konferenz wie geplant vor Ort abzuhalten, deswegen findet diese als öffentlich-zugängliche, virtuelle Konferenz statt.
Für den call for papers klicken Sie bitte hier .
Unsere Keynote Speakers sind:
- Pierpaolo Battigalli, Bocconi University
- Johannes Hörner, Yale University
- Benny Moldovanu, University of Bonn
Öffentliche Vorträge
„Wir wollens wissen: Wofür brauchen wir Gesetze?“ [Audio-Podcast]. Antenne Kärnten. (15. Februar 2022).
Ökonomie und Impfstrategie: SARS-CoV-2 Impfungen zu verkaufen!? Die Presse, 15. Februar 2021.
Ökonomische Perspektiven des Lebensmittellabelings (am Beispiel von Bioprodukten). 6. „WIWI-aktuell“ Vortrags- und Diskussionsreihe, 29. Oktober 2015.
Spieltheorie und Ökonomie. Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft Kärnten, 6. April 2016.
The leisure of the theory class. Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Antrittsvorlesung, 25. Mai 2016.
Science meets Sports. Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, 19. April 2018.
Self-amendment and Gödel’s loophole. Austrian Research & Innovation Talk, September 17, 2020.
