

Curriculum Vitae: Paul Schweinzer

Research interests: Game theory, Mechanism design, Contract theory, Microeconomics.

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<http://www.uni-klu.ac.at/vwl/inhalt/902.htm>.

Positions

2015– **University of Klagenfurt**, Full Professor of Economics.
2010–15 **University of York**, Senior Lecturer in Economics.
2009–10 **University of Manchester**, Lecturer in Microeconomics.
2004–09 **University of Bonn**, Assistant Professor at Benny Moldovanu’s chair.
1988–98 Private sector **IT consultant**. Professional bi-weekly DJ.

Visiting positions held at University of Adelaide (Australia); CESifo, Ludwig Maximilians University (Munich, Germany); University of International Business and Economics (Beijing, China); Paris School of Economics, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (France); Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas (France); University of Zürich (Switzerland); Warsaw University of Technology, Business School (Poland); and Carnegie Mellon University (USA).

Education

1999–04 **University of London**,
‘Bloomsbury’ PhD (Birkbeck College) in Economics and Finance.
1998–99 **London School of Economics and Political Science**,
MSc in Economics and Philosophy.
1993–98 **University of Vienna**, MSc (‘Magister’) in Economics.
1985–88 **Technical University Vienna**, Computer Science.

Selected presentations

Conferences: Econometric Society World Congress 2015, American Economic Association Meetings 2004 & 10, Royal Economic Society Meetings 2009–15, European Econometric Society / European Economic Association Meetings 2006, 08, 12, 15, & 16 Game Theory Society Congress 2004, 08, 12, & 16, Society for the Advancement of Economic

Theory Meetings 2011–12, Society of Economic Design Conference 2008–09, & 17, Association for Mathematics Applied to Economics and Social Sciences (AMASES) 2016, Midwest Economic Theory Meetings 2007 & 09, Game Theory Conference at Stony Brook 2002–06, UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory 2010–12, & 16.

Departmental: Aberdeen, Adelaide, Ann Arbor, Barcelona, Beijing, Belgrade, Bergen, (WZB) Berlin, (IZA) Bonn, Boston, Braga, Brisbane, Cambridge, Copenhagen, East Anglia, Grenoble, Hanover, Innsbruck, Jerusalem, Linz, Lisbon, London, Maastricht, Manchester, Mannheim, Milan, Munich, (New) York, Norwich, Paris 1&2, Pittsburgh, Prague, Raleigh, Saragossa, Singapore, Sydney, Tromsø, Vienna, Zurich.

Work in progress

1. “Optimal team composition and the Apollo syndrome,” with A. Gershkov.
2. “Obfuscation in teams,” with A. Gershkov and J. Li.
3. “Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences,” with B. Klose, *York DP#12/32*.
4. “The parental co-immunization hypothesis,” with M. Portela, *CESifo Working Paper #4472*.
5. “Labelling contests with endogenous precision,” with P. Fleckinger and B. Roussillon.

Refereed publications

1. “How to share it out: the value of information in teams,” with A. Gershkov and J. Li, *Journal of Economic Theory*, **162**, 2016, 261–304, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.013>.
2. “Agreeing on efficient emissions reduction,” with O. Bos and B. Roussillon, *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, **118**(4), 2016, 785–815, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12164>.
3. “Implementation without incentive compatibility: two Stories with partially informed planners,” with M. Shimoji, *Games and Economic Behavior*, **91**, 2015, 258–67, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.007>.
4. “Probabilistic procurement auctions,” with T. Giebe, *Review of Economic Design*, **19**(1), 2015, 25–46, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-014-0161-6>.
5. “Consuming your way to efficiency: public goods provision through non-distortionary tax lotteries,” with T. Giebe, *European Journal of Political Economy*, **36**, 2014, 1–12, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.06.006>.

6. “All-pay-all aspects of political decision making,” with T. Giebe, *Public Choice*, **161**(1), 2014, 73–90, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-013-0127-1>.
7. “The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests,” with E. Segev, *Public Choice*, **153**(1), 2012, 69–82, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9774-2>.
8. “When queueing is better than push and shove,” with A. Gershkov, *International Journal of Game Theory*, **39**(3), 2010, 409–30, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0198-x>.
9. “Sequential bargaining with common values,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, **46**(1), 2010, 109–21, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.09.001>.
10. “Efficient tournaments within teams,” with A. Gershkov and J. Li, *RAND Journal of Economics*, **40**(1), 2009, 103–19, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00057.x>.
11. “Labour market recruiting with intermediaries,” *Review of Economic Design*, **12**(2), 2008, 119–27, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0045-8>.
12. “The roles of stories in applying game theory,” with T. Grüne-Yanoff, *Journal of Economic Methodology*, **15**(2), 2008, 131–46, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501780802115075>.
13. “Two competing paradigms in Austrian economic theory,” *Notizie di Politeia*, XVI, 59, 2000, 44–66. (Part of Viennese MSc thesis.)

Other publications

1. Book review of Hendricks, Vincent F., and Pelle G. Hansen (eds.), *Game Theory: 5 Questions*, Automatic Press/VIP, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, **165**(3), 2009, 558–9, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245609789471970>.

Selected invited talks

1. Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Faro, July 2013 (organized by D. Wettstein), “Auctioning risk: The all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences.”
2. Workshop on the Economics of Climate Change, Collège de France, October 2012 (organized by R. Guesnerie, J-P. Ponsard, J. Pouyet), “Efficient Emissions Reduction” and “Risk pooling in redistributive agreements.”
3. UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory, November 2011 (organized by J. Weymark), “Consuming your way to efficiency.”
4. Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, Faro, June 2011 (organized by T. Kaplan), “Labelling contests with endogenous precision.”
5. SFB/TR 15 Research Workshop, Berlin, May 2010 (organized by T. Giebe), “Efficient contest design.”

6. NBER Market Design Workshop, MIT & Harvard, May 2009 (organized by S. Athey and P. Pathak), “When queueing is better than push and shove.”

Professional duties

Co-editor of the *Journal of Institution and Mechanism design*.

Co-organizer of the *Conference on Economic Design*, University of York, 2017.

Refereeing

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Review, Bulletin of Economic Research, Econometrica, Economic Inquiry, Economic Journal, Economic Theory, Economics and Philosophy, European Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, International Economic Review, International Game Theory Review, International Journal of Game Theory, International Journal of Industrial Organization, International Tax and Public Finance, Journal of Economics, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Public Choice, RAND Journal of Economics, Review of Economic Design, Review of Economic Studies. Several (inter)national grant issuing bodies.

Awards

University of York Super Pump Priming, Visiting scholarship (Center for Rationality, Jerusalem), Marie Curie fellowship of the European Union (CORE, Louvain and UAB, Barcelona), Junior fellowship of the Royal Economic Society, Birkbeck College economics department scholarship, Austrian government postgraduate scholarship.

Memberships

CESifo network member.

Personal

Born on May 21st, 1966 in Krems/Donau, Austria.

Language skills: German, English, a little French and Danish.

Blissfully married to Aline M. Längle, delightful children Caspar & Signe.